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INTRODUCTION 
Roughly one-third of Americans yield control of their money in 
the hope hedge funds, mutual funds, and private equity funds (pooled 
investment funds) will achieve better returns than those Americans 
would achieve on their own.1  In order to operate within financial 
 
1. Gary Mottola, A Snapshot of Investor Households in America, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1 (Sept. 2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fixed-
income-advisory-committee/finra-investor-education-foundation-investor-
1
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standards of compliance,2 pooled investment funds must collaborate 
with a great number of financial intermediaries.3  Working with 
intermediaries makes operating a pooled investment fund more costly 
and sometimes decreases the fund’s transparency.4  Moreover, pooled 
investment funds are investing in many digital technologies, despite 
their volatile characteristics, to provide a more efficient way to 
operate.5  One such technology is blockchain.6 
 
households-fimsa-040918.pdf (“Data from the 2012 National Financial Capability 
study indicate[d] that 33[%] of U.S. households own taxable investment accounts 
[such as] stocks, bonds or mutual funds”). 
2. See The Evolution of a Core Financial Service: Custodian & Depositary 
Banks, DELOITTE (2019) [hereinafter The Evolution of a Core Financial Service], 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-services/lu-
the-evolution-of-a-core-financial-service.pdf. 
3. See Prachi M., Financial Intermediaries, INVESTORS BOOK, 
https://theinvestorsbook.com/financial-intermediaries.html (last visited Mar. 1, 
2021). There are regulations for issuance, clearing and settlement, asset monitoring, 
and transaction oversight. An intermediary is a financial institution serving as a 
“middle-man” to facilitate transactions. See The Evolution of a Core Financial 
Service, supra note 2, at 13; James Chen, Financial Intermediary, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialintermediary.asp#:~:text=A%20fina
ncial%20intermediary%20is%20an,mutual%20fund%2C%20or%20pension%20fun
d (last updated Jan. 29, 2021). 
4. Intermediaries lack transparency because their business model involves 
asymmetrical access to information. Intermediaries are costly because the current 
regulatory structure and intermediaries’ steep barrier to entry keeps intermediaries 
solely on top of this informational hierarchy. These dynamics allow intermediaries 
to charge higher fees through inelasticity and limited supply. See Kathryn Judge, 
Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 577–78 (2015) (“In a dynamic 
environment, however, intermediaries may use . . . informational and positional 
advantages to promote and entrench high-fee institutional arrangements”) 
(emphasis added). 
5. See Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, The Layers Of Digital Financial 
Innovation: Charting A Regulatory Response, 25 FORDHAM. J. CORP. FIN. L. 381, 
397-99 (2020) (stating, in reference to the previous boom-bust cryptocurrency 
market cycle in 2017-2018, “tokenization unleashes opportunities for asset 
management, fund raising, investing, and other financial services. Nonetheless, 
despite the initial perception of the endless invasion of digital assets in the financial 
markets, latest data show that ‘the hype of 2017 was unsustainable.’”). 
6. See, e.g., Sinclair Davidson, Primavera De Filippi & Jason Potts, 
Blockchains and the Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 14 J. INST. ECON. 639, 
639–40 (2018) (stating “[t]hose who take a long position on blockchain technology 
are in effect arguing that it will improve the efficiency of economic systems by 
disintermediating many current patterns of exchange and production, thus improving 
2
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Currently, entrepreneurs are developing blockchain technologies 
to largely replace the custodial banks,7 forensic accountants, transfer 
agents, and clearing services88 with whom pooled investment funds 
work with.9  Blockchain can begin to replace these intermediaries 
through a conditional instrument called “smart contracts.”10 
 
economic efficiency.”) (emphasis added). Bradley Keoun, Tiny $217 Options Trade 
on Bitcoin Blockchain Could Be Wall Street’s Death Knell, COINDESK (Oct. 8, 2019, 
9:30 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/tiny-217-options-trade-on-bitcoin-blockchain-
could-be-wall-streets-death-knell; How One Woman Is Institutionalizing Asset 
Management On Blockchain, DIGFIN GROUP (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.digfingroup.com/blockchain-assets/. 
7. “A custodian or custodian bank is a financial institution that holds 
customers’ securities for safekeeping to prevent them from being stolen or lost. The 
custodian may hold stocks or other assets in electronic or physical form.” Adam 
Barone, Custodian, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/custodian.asp (last updated Oct. 15, 2020); 
see DigFin, supra note 6. 
8. “Clearing is the procedure by which financial trades settle - that is, the 
correct and timely transfer of funds to the seller and securities to the buyer.” James 
Chen, Clearing, INVESTOPEDIA [hereinafter Chen, Clearing], 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/clearing.asp (last updated Dec. 22, 2020); see 
Keoun, supra note 6. 
9. See Rodríguez, supra note 5, at 400-14 (“[D]igital technology can perform 
the same economic function as traditional financial intermediaries through a 
different architecture—blockchain-based settlement systems or trading platforms—
providing a valid example of a dimension that would be overlooked by a rigid 
technology-neutral approach.”). 
10. See Deloitte, supra note 2, at 33 (“Once assets like shares or bonds are 
digitized on a distributed ledger, corporate actions could be managed using smart 
contracts, which are built in or referenced programs that can automatically trigger 
events such as distribution of dividends, stock splits, shareholder voting etc.”); Jake 
Frankenfield, Smart Contracts, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/smart-contracts.asp (last updated Oct. 8, 
2019) (“A smart contract is a self-executing contract with the terms of the agreement 
between buyer and seller being directly written into lines of code. The code and the 
agreements contained therein exist across a distributed, decentralized blockchain 
network. The code controls the execution, and transactions are trackable and 
irreversible.”); Caitlin Reilly, CFTC Advisory Panel to Examine Growth, Hurdles of 
‘Decentralized Finance’, in CQ ROLL CALL WASHINGTON SECURITIES 
ENFORCEMENT & LITIGATION BRIEFING (2020), Westlaw 2020 CQSECRPT 1342 
(“Decentralized finance or ‘DeFi’ seeks to disrupt the use of intermediaries in 
financial services through the use of blockchain-based smart contracts. The contracts 
are computer programs designed to automatically document or execute the terms of 
an agreement, which could have implications for the derivatives industry.”). 
3
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Investors will benefit from limited adoption and use of smart 
contracts among pooled investment funds because smart contracts 
would decrease fees11 and increase returns.12  Regulators will play a 
vital role in spurring adoption of smart contracts among pooled 
investment funds.  Nevertheless, regulators should maintain derivative 
regulations13 and recent consumer protections.14  If regulators strike 
the right balance, millions of Americans could save in indirect fees.15   
Despite the perception that the American public is hesitant to 
adopt crypto solutions to its investing strategy,16 many American 
consumers are experimenting with these same solutions on their 
 
11. For example, $20,000,000.00 would be the management fee for a billion 
dollar fund. A billion dollar transaction could be made for around $5.00 if 
completed through a standard blockchain or smart contract platform. Someone 
Transferred a Billion Dollars in Bitcoin For Less Than $5 [hereinafter Someone 
Transferred a Billion Dollars], COIN TELEGRAPH, 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/someone-transferred-a-billion-dollars-in-bitcoin-for-
less-than-5 (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
12. Pooled investment funds are straying away from the standard “2 and 20” 
fee structure when their performance is mediocre. This implies pooled investment 
funds are willing to pass on lower fees to investors. See Tom Teodorczuk, Only a 
Third of Hedge Funds Charge ‘2 and 20’ Fees, Says Expert, BARRON’S (Nov. 11, 
2018, 7:00 AM), https//www.barrons.com/articles/only-a-third-of-hedge-funds-
charge-2-and-20-fees-says-expert-1541851200. 
13. Regulations over derivatives are enforced by the CFTC. “The Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is an independent U.S. federal agency 
established by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974. The 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulates the commodity futures and 
options markets. Its goals include the promotion of competitive and efficient futures 
markets and the protection of investors against manipulation, abusive trade 
practices, and fraud.” James Chen, Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), INVESTOPEDIA [hereinafter Chen, CTFC], 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cftc.asp (last updated Apr. 9, 2019). 
14. Consumer protections alluded to here stem from the CFPB. “The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is a regulatory agency charged with 
overseeing financial products and services that are offered to consumers.” Jim 
Probasco, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), INVESTOPEDIA 
[hereinafter Probasco, CFPB], https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-cfpb.asp (last updated July 2, 2020). 
15. See Teodorczuk, supra note 12. 
16. Jonathan Leong, To Accelerate Cryptocurrency Adoption We Must First 
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own.17  The chief concern with deploying smart contracts within 
pooled investment funds is replacing financial intermediaries with 
smart contracts is novel and not yet regulated enough to ensure 
investor protection.18 
This Comment advocates for supplementing financial 
intermediaries with smart contracts while maintaining the consumer 
protections outlined in legislation following the 2008 Great Recession.  
Part I will focus on the current industry’s framework and effects on 
American investors.  This section also explores the latent, competing, 
and conflicting notions of investor protection and efficiency within the 
current regulatory framework.  Part II gives an overview and 
background of blockchain, cryptocurrency, and smart contracts.  Part 
III focuses on potential problems and solutions regulators may 
consider when implementing smart contract technologies.  Finally, 
this article concludes with a summation of the proposed solution and 
set of problems to avoid. 
I.  POOLED INVESTMENT FUNDS’ CURRENT FRAMEWORK 
The debate over whether the federal government regulates the 
American financial industry too little19 or too much20 creates a 
 
17. Why Crypto Asset Management is the Next Big Thing, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/tech/why-crypto-asset-management-next-big-thing/ 
(last updated Jan. 25, 2020). 
18. See The Evolution of a Core Financial Service, supra note 2, at 27; 
DigFin, supra note 6. 
19. See Alec C. Covington, Fighting Yesterday’s Battles: Proposed Changes 
To The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 299, 321 
(2012); Thomas W. Joo, Lehman 10 Years Later: The Dodd-Frank Rollback, 50 
LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 561, 562 (2019); Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault 
On The Structure Of The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. 2543, 2545–46 (2019). 
20. See Audrey D. Wisotsky & David W. Freese, Sweeping Federal Financial 
Reform Legislation Overhauls the U.S. Financial System, 266 N.J. L., Oct. 2010, at 
9, 13 (claiming that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act is “massive in scope, and its effects likely will be far reaching”). Compare Todd 
Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior Or Menace?, 81 
GEORGE WASH. L. REV. 856, 856 (2013) (pointing out structural flaws in the CFPB 
and claiming that this structure will lead to “excessive risk aversion, agency 
imperialism, and tunnel vision”), with Hosea H. Harvey, Constitutionalizing 
Consumer Financial Protection: The Case For The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2429, 2432 (2019) (commenting on the imminence of a 
5
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difficult balancing act.21  On one hand, America wants its best 
financial minds to compete with foreign investors,22 but America also 
wants sufficient safeguards to protect investors from bad financial 
outcomes.23  This is where financial intermediaries enter, offering 
investors a buffer between investors’ money and portfolio managers’ 
irresponsible decisions.24  Although valuable, these intermediaries are 
not cheap.25  This section is split into two parts.  The first looks at 
pooled investment funds’ incurred expenses and inefficiencies from 
working with financial intermediaries.  The second explores why these 
expenses are mandatory, how legislation for these expenses arose 
from the Great Recession of 2008, and why legislators thought these 
mandates would better protect investors. 
 
constitutional challenge to the CFPB in the Supreme Court due to a perception that 
the Court will find the CFPB unconstitutionally structured), and Martin J. Gatens, 
Note, Five-To-Four: The Case For A Defensive Redesign Of The CFPB, 98 TEX. L. 
REV. 1115, 1117 (2020) (advocating for the underlying principles of the CFPB, but 
working from the presumption that the CFPB will be reformed due to constitutional 
concerns over its structure). 
21. See Michael C. Nissim-Sabat, Note, Capturing This Watchdog? The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Keeping the Special Interests Out of Its 
House, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) ( remembering that after the 2008 Great 
Recession, markets desperately needed effective regulatory reform). But see 
Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Intermediaries and Markets 20 (The 
Wharton Fin.  Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 00-44-C, 2003), 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6649969.pdf (stating, “[t]here is no scope for 
welfare-improving government intervention to prevent financial crises”). 
22. Zywicki, supra note 20, at 880. 
23. See infra Subpart I.B. 
24. See Judge, supra note 4, at 574 (“[Generally,] intermediaries can bridge 
information asymmetries, enable parties to find one another, and otherwise make it 
easier for parties to overcome the many barriers to transacting.”). But see Jason 
Koebler, Send This to Anyone Who Wants to Know WTF Is Up With GameStop 
Stock, VICE (Jan. 27, 2021, 10:36 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkdvgy/send-this-to-anyone-who-wants-to-know-
wtf-is-up-with-gamestop-stock (stating that an investment firm, Melvin Capital, was 
overextended in its short positions on GameStop securities. “By all accounts, Melvin 
Capital [was] in deep trouble . . . it took in $2.75 billion in funding, reportedly to 
help cover its GameStop shorts.” This unfortunate outcome happened after 
intermediaries signed off on Melvin Capital’s entries into its short positions.). 
25. Judge, supra note 4, at 578 (“[I]ntermediaries may use [their] 
informational and positional advantages to promote and entrench high-fee 
institutional arrangements”). 
6
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A.  Investors’ Fees From Pooled Investment Funds 
Typically, a portfolio manager (also known as a deal team leader) 
runs a pooled investment fund.26  The portfolio manager employs 
professional teams to execute delegated responsibilities.27  
Additionally, pooled investment funds and financial intermediaries 
must have a relationship.28  Financial intermediaries check and 
oversee a fund’s work.29  These financial intermediaries include 
transfer agents and custodians, who audit and monitor services.30  
Additionally, clearing and settlement services are also 
intermediaries.31 
For their specialized work, third-party intermediaries charge high 
fees,32 resulting in financial costs to investors.33  Financial 
intermediaries also make up a significant portion of pooled investment 
funds’ expenses.34  When taken into consideration with intermediary 
services’ mandatory nature, fees can quickly add up for pooled 
investment funds.  Each of the intermediaries is a separate entity.35  
 
26. Building a Fund Management Team, GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, 
https://thegiin.org/building-a-fund-management-
team#:~:text=A%20typical%20fund%20management%20team,on%20its%20size%
20and%20need (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). See generally The Evolution of a Core 
Financial Service, supra note 2. 
27. Gregory Scopino, Preparing Financial Regulation For the Second 
Machine Age: The Need For Oversight of Digital Intermediaries In the Futures 
Markets, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 439, 465 (2015) (“Congress placed additional 
categories of intermediaries under CFTC oversight.”); see CEA § 8a(5), 7 U.S.C. § 
12a(5). 
28. The Evolution of a Core Financial Service, supra note 2, at 13. 
29. Id.; see CEA § 8a(5), 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5). 
30. Id. 
31. Upgrading Blockchains, DELOITTE (June 8, 2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/focus/signals-for-strategists/using-
blockchain-for-smart-contracts.html. 
32. Judge, supra note 4, at 578. 
33. Investors cannot avoid these costs due to regulations requiring pooled 
investment funds to employ intermediaries throughout the process. See id. See 
generally The Evolution of a Core Financial Service, supra note 2. 
34. See Judge, supra note 4, at 578. See also The Evolution of a Core 
Financial Service, supra note 2, at 29 (stating that automation would save asset 
managers 30-40% in expenses). 
35. Barone, Custodian, supra note 7; see also Chen, Clearing, supra note 8. 
7
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Each intermediary employs its own staff.36  Each intermediary also 
gathers its own repetitive records of what the fund is planning or 
attempting to do.37 
Additionally, operating costs are high, and those costs are in 
addition to any intermediary expenses.38  Different types of funds, 
whether hedge funds, private equity, or mutual funds, have different 
operation costs.39  Typical hedge funds or private equity funds charge 
up to 2% of total assets under management to meet the expenses 
associated with running their respective funds.40 
On the lower end of pooled investment fund expense sheets, a 
mutual fund could expect between 0.25-1% of total assets under 
management to constitute running expenses.41  A minority of pooled 
investment funds may offer cheaper fee rates than other pooled 
investment funds, but those funds achieve a lower rate through 
lending out acquired equities, bonds, or other debt instruments while 
those assets are in their custody.42  Investors may save money from 
lower fees, but investors also incur more risk.  Not only is the 
 
36. See Barone, supra note 7; Chen, Clearing, supra note 8; The Evolution of 
a Financial Core Service, supra note 2, at 20. 
37. Id. 
38. Grant Thornton LLP & Stonegate Capital Partners, How Do You Start a 
Hedge Fund? The New Era of Hedge Fund Creation and Operational Management, 
MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N 8 (Dec. 2011), https://www.managedfunds.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/Starting-a-hedge-fund-GrantThornton-Stonegate-Capital-
Dec-2011.pdf (“In general, a manager that is looking to start either a domestic or 
offshore hedge fund is faced with budgeting approximately $75,000 in hedge fund 
startup costs, as well as annual costs averaging $100,000.”). 
39. See id. See also Barry Steinman, Private Equity Fund Expenses, DUANE 
MORRIS 1 (Fall 2014), 
https://www.duanemorris.com/site/static/private_equity_fund_expenses.pdf. 
40. Steinman, supra note 39, at 5. 
41. OFF. OF INV. EDUC. & ADVOC., SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN: MUTUAL FUND 
FEES AND EXPENSES 2 (2014) [hereinafter OFF. OF INV. EDUC. & ADVOC]., 
https://www.sec.gov/files/ib_mutualfundfees.pdf  
42. See The Evolution of a Core Financial Service, supra note 2, at 20; see 
also Securities Lending—Where Banks Win, But Can’t Lose, THIS MATTER 
[hereinafter Securities Lending], https://thismatter.com/money/banking/securities-
lending.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2021) (“ . . . JPMorgan Chase & Company took 
40% of profits made by lending out the securities of a New Orleans municipal 
pension fund, but when such investments lost $340,000 for the fund, the pension 
fund had to absorb the entire loss”). 
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 57 [2021], No. 2, Art. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol57/iss2/13
Mouton camera ready (Do Not Delete) 6/19/2021  10:34 AM 
2021] REGULATING SMART CONTRACTS 449 
investor’s capital being used by a portfolio manager, but the assets 
their capital bought are lent to unknown parties.43 
Further, separate intermediaries work together to verify pooled 
investment funds’ records because the services a fund needs are not 
always completed by a single intermediary.44  When working on a 
single deal or transaction, distinct intermediaries usually partake in 
limited communication between each other due to their contracting 
fund’s highly sensitive and confidential service.45  When 
intermediaries finally reconcile each other’s records, the fund incurs 
associated fees.46  This slow process is inefficient, but it is essential to 
ensuring the fund upholds its promises to investors.47  The role of 
intermediaries is ultimately a worthy service, albeit a very costly one. 
Although the fee structure of pooled investment funds has little 
variance between funds of the same type, a majority of hedge funds 
follow similar fee structures.48  A majority of private equity funds and 
mutual funds also follow similar fee structures.49  However, the slight 
 
43. See Steve Kaaru, Bank of New York Mellon Accused of Aiding $4B 
OneCoin Scam, COINGEEK (Sept. 29, 2020), https://coingeek.com/bank-of-new-
york-mellon-accused-of-aiding-4b-onecoin-scam/ (detailing how one custodian 
bank, BNY Mellon, was caught aiding a $4 billion money laundering scheme). 
44. See Grant Thornton, supra note 38, at 9 (noting that, “most [smaller prime 
brokers] maintain a fully disclosed custody and clearing relationship with one or 
more of the larger global custodians”). 
45. The Evolution of a Core Financial Service, supra note 2, at 38 (“It is well 
known that custodian and depositary banks hold and operate with strictly 
confidential client data.”). 
46. Intermediary specialization leads to further, mandated transaction costs 
whenever collaboration between distinct intermediaries is necessary. See Judge, 
supra note 4, at 601 (“In the view of some scholars, the SEC’s failure to bring an 
end to fixed fees on its own initiative may suggest that “the SEC is not motivated by 
some ‘public interest,’ but rather by the changing strength of competing, well-
organized special interests, and securities firms were far better organized than the 
parties that they served”). 
47. Thus “bridg[ing] information asymmetries.” Judge, supra note 4, at 574. 
48. Teodorczuk, supra note 12. (Historically, hedge funds charged “2 and 20.” 
“[H]edge funds are paid a flat rate 2% management fee as well as a 20% 
performance fee.” Nevertheless, some funds are electing to charge a “1-10-20” 
structure. “Managers have a management fee of 1% and then a 10% incentive fee 
below a 10% net return, and a 20% incentive fee for returns above 10%.”). 
49. Id.; see also OFF. OF INV. EDUC. & ADVOC, supra note 41. 
9
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variance in fee structures is not guaranteed to all investors.50  Pooled 
investment funds show preference to investors with long-standing 
partnerships or larger allocations.51  The standard fee most investors 
pay to pooled investment funds is 2% of assets under management and 
20% of profits.52  For these investors, the full burden of costs can be 
quite expensive or risky under the current fee structure.53 
Investors can either pay steeper running costs due to fund’s 
expenses or they can save on expense but pay an opportunity cost of 
higher risk.  Both options are less than ideal.  Impliedly, investors’ 
only way to save on fee costs is to let more risk enter into managing 
their capital or hope their chosen fund will offer a lower fee rate.   The 
high costs, high inefficiencies, and low transparency make the 
intermediary industry ripe for technological disruption.  Nevertheless, 
disruptive technologies, such as smart contracts, cannot enter the 
intermediary market without clearing significant regulatory hurdles, 
which are fully ingrained in the incumbent intermediary industry. 
B. Why Intermediary Fees Are Currently Mandatory 
Investors have minimal choice in whether they pay pooled 
investment funds’ fees because each fund needs to cover its tax, 
auditing, and administrative expenses.54  Due to congressional 
legislation, pooled investment funds have mandatory costs.  
Specifically, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), passed in 2010, brought a host of 
mandates meant to better protect consumer investors in the wake of 
the Great Recession.55  Specific provisions of Dodd-Frank touch upon 
 
50.  OFF. OF INV. EDUC. & ADVOC, supra note 41 (“Different investors in the 
same fund may be charged different management fees. Larger investors may require 
reduced management fees.”). 
51. Id. 
52. Mutual Funds vs. Hedge Funds: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/173.asp (last updated Oct. 21, 2020). 
53. Securities Lending, supra note 42. 
54. Grant Thornton, supra note 38, at 8. 
55. Mauricio Salazar, Swapping More Than Regulations: Reexamining the 
Goals of the Dodd-Frank Act and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
on Over-The-Counter Derivative Markets, 21 SW. J. INT’L L. 217, 218, 223–24 
(2014); see also Carney Simpson, Do End-Users Get The Best Of Both Worlds?, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1759, 1762 (2012); Laurin C. Ariail, The Impact Of Dodd-
10
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consumer investors, investment funds, and financial intermediaries.  
Title IV of Dodd-Frank mandates hedge funds to register with the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).56  Under Title VII, 
regulators must approve exotic investment vehicles before those 
investment vehicles are sold to citizens.57  Title IX sought to grant 
even more comprehensive protections to investors.58  Further, within 
these provisions, regulators attempted to provide additional 
disclosures about the riskiness of investments to investors.59  Dodd-
Frank also crafted a cohesive operating structure for the derivatives 
market, avoiding the disconnected nature of the pre-2008 era.60 
Investors, now armed with greater knowledge, could make better-
informed decisions with their capital.61  In essence, Dodd-Frank not 
only created “rules of the road”62 for the modern era of finance, but it 
also offered increased consumer protection for investors.63 
 
Frank On End-Users Hedging Commercial Risk In Over-The-Counter Derivatives 
Markets, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 175, 176 (2011). 
56. Dodd-Frank: Title IV - Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and 
Others, CORNELL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_IV (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2021). 
57. Id. 
58. For instance, Title IX establishes the Investor Advisory Committee which 
promotes investor confidence regarding the integrity of the securities market through 
conducting SEC studies on brokers, dealers, and investment advisors. Dodd-Frank: 
Title IX - Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities, 
CORNELL [hereinafter Dodd-Frank: Title IX], 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_ix_-
_investor_protections_and_improvements_to_the_regulation_of_securities (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2021). 
59. Id. 
60. Salazar, supra note 55, at 224 (“[T]he United States passed Dodd-Frank, a 
comprehensive reform in the regulation of derivative markets that went into effect 
on July 21, 2010”). 
61. Dodd-Frank: Title IX, supra note 58. 
62. Create New Financial Regulations, POLITIFACT, 
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/422/create-
new-financial-regulations/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2021). 
63. Dodd-Frank: Title IX, supra note 58. 
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However, critics of Dodd-Frank-era regulations argue they 
decreases efficiency.64  Dodd-Frank’s top-down mandates have 
suffered from criticisms of structural design65 and constitutionality.66 
Although the costs associated with increasing investor protection 
are worthwhile67—especially after the widespread pain of the Great 
Recession—they are steep.  It is difficult for regulators to harmonize 
the competing interests of investor protection and efficiency, but novel 
technology offers a new frontier for both investors and regulators.  
Blockchain can service transactions at a fraction of the cost and offer 
greater transparency through public transactions.  Efficiency-minded 
regulators favor blockchain’s low transactional cost, while consumer 
protection and transparency-minded regulators favor blockchain’s 
public-view nature. 
II. HOW SMART CONTRACTS WORK 
American law is notorious for being slow to respond to emerging 
technology.68  Blockchain and cryptocurrency are not exempt, as 
regulations are far behind the complex and ever-changing industry.69  
 
64. Zywicki, supra note 20. (“Proponents of the CFPB argue that extreme 
independence is justified to insulate it from political pressures. But the history of 
regulation teaches that insulation can be isolation, resulting in inefficient 
regulation.”). 
65. Martin J. Gatens, Five-To-Four: The Case For A Defensive Redesign Of 
The CFPB, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1117 (2020). 
66. Harvey, supra note 20, at 2432. 
67. Joo, supra note 19, at 562 (“[E]ven assuming Dodd-Frank’s ‘regulatory 
burdens’ are significant ones, ‘regulatory relief’ is not necessarily justified: the cost 
savings for banks may be outweighed by increased risks to the institutions, their 
customers, or the financial system generally”). 
68. Paula H. Holderman, Adapting to the New Legal Marketplace, 102 ILL. B. 
J. 160, 161 (2014) (stating “[o]ne of the slowest institutions to change is the legal 
academy,” and that small law firms were slow to adapt to LegalZoom); see also 
supra Part I.B. 
69. See Douglas Horn, The Chance for DeFi to Fulfill the Technology’s 
Promise, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 2, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/the-
chance-for-defi-to-fulfill-the-technology-s-promise (noting how decentralized 
finance within the blockchain industry has already allowed early cash outs, inflation, 
voting that is similar to a poll, and more); see also Sai Agnikhotram & Antonios 
Kouroutakis, Doctrinal Challenges for the Legality of Smart Contracts: Lex 
Cryptographia or a New, ‘Smart’ Way to Contract?, 19 J. HIGH TECH. L. 300, 303 
(2019) (noting a common skeptical viewpoint: “In the public sphere, many conclude 
12
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The last two years have seen exponential growth in decentralized 
finance (DeFi).70  DeFi is the use of blockchain technology in bank-
less finance,71 which allows private citizens to use their capital similar 
to central banks.72  DeFi also affords private citizens the opportunity 
to launch their own hedge funds73 and invest on behalf of other 
people.74  Currently, these innovations are mostly unregulated, but 
future regulations may affect all of DeFi because of DeFi’s reliance on 
smart contracts.75 
Current practices within the blockchain industry may have 
outpaced what regulators imagined blockchain would become.  The 
innovation is even more impressive when one considers the entire 
industry is only twelve years old.  The fast-paced news cycles of the 
blockchain sector, along with its novelty, leave the layperson gasping 
 
that the lack of a comprehensive regulatory approach is a major issue for further 
propagation of this technology.”); see also Brad Rosen, Decentralized Finance 
Trends and Challenges Spotlighted at CFTC’s Technology Advisory Committee 
Meeting, WOLTERS KLUWER (Dec. 15, 2020), 
https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/news/securities-regulation-daily/decentralized-
finance-trends-and-challenges-spotlighted-at-cftc-s-technology-advisory-committee-
meeting/128235 (detailing a recent attempt by CFTC regulators to understand the 
challenges of decentralized finance years after first becoming aware of DAOs, a 
major DeFi innovation). 
70. At the end of May 2020, there was less than $1 billion “locked” in DeFi 
projects. Over the next six months that amount would swell to nearly $15 billion. 
DEFI PULSE, https://defipulse.com/; see also Jeremy Eng-Tuck Cheaah, What is 
DeFi and Why is It the Hottest Ticket in Cryptocurrencies, THE CONVERSATION, 
https://theconversation.com/what-is-defi-and-why-is-it-the-hottest-ticket-in-
cryptocurrencies-144883 (last visited Feb. 28, 2021). 
71. Id. 
72. Matthew Prewitt, Decentralized Liquidity Is the Backbone of DeFi, 
COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/decentralized-liquidity-is-the-backbone-of-
defi (last visited Fe. 28, 2021); see also Horn, supra note 69. 
73. Reto Trinkler & Mona El Isa, Melon Protocol: A Blockchain Protocol For 
Digital Asset Management Draft, GITHUB, 
https://github.com/enzymefinance/paper/blob/master/melonprotocol.pdf (last 
modified June 28, 2017). 
74. Manuel Stagars, Technology-Regulated and Operated Funds—The Vision 
of the Multichain Asset Managers Association (MAMA), MEDIUM: INSIGHTS BY 
BASE 58 (June 12, 2018), https://medium.com/base58/technology-regulated-and-
operated-funds-the-vision-of-the-multichain-asset-managers-association-
f14b7205d253. 
75. Rosen, supra note 69. 
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for air.76  This section briefly defines the common terms of the 
industry. 
A. Blockchain, a Public Platform 
Blockchain is a public ledger system akin to a large-scale ledger 
or spreadsheet.77  It is analogous to an online banking account, where 
a user can see funds transferring in and out, accounting for expenses.78  
Blockchain’s ledger is visible to all users.79  Continuing with the 
online banking analogy, imagine if all bank account users were able to 
see both a bank’s total cash balance (the aggregate of all cash the bank 
holds) and every transaction made by any of that bank’s accounts.80  
In this scenario, users could see their own online banking statements 
(complete with transfers in and out of their account), but users could 
also see every other transaction made involving the bank’s user 
accounts.81  This means every transaction involving any of the bank’s 
account numbers would be available for public view.82 
Although public, there would still be a level of anonymity because 
users can only see another’s bank account number—rather than a 
 
76. Leong, supra note 16. 
77. VIMI GREWAL-CARR & STEPHEN MARSHALL, DELOITTE, BLOCKCHAIN: 
ENIGMA, PARADOX, OPPORTUNITY 4 (2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/Innovation/deloitte-
uk-blockchain-full-report.pdf (describing the basic parameters of a miner’s role 
within a blockchain transaction); see Luke Conway, Blockchain Explained, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp (last updated 
Nov. 17, 2020). 
78. Online banking is analogous to blockchain’s ledger because a transaction 
can either add to or subtract from a user’s total balance. GREWAL-CARR & 
MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 12 (“transactions are tied to ‘wallets’ rather than to 
individuals”). 
79. Id. at 6. 
80. See id. at 4–5 (Not only are miners aware of transactions but so are 
transacting parties and anyone who searches for the “public key.” “[Users] receive 
the first confirmation that the [cryptocurrency] was signed over to [them]. All the 
transactions in the block are now fulfilled and [the recipient] gets paid.”). 
81. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“The Bitcoin network is public because anyone can read 
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user’s name or any other personally identifying characteristics.83  The 
only way, in this scenario, for a user to know how a second user 
transacted would be if one user knew the other’s account number (and 
vice versa).84  One could not see each account’s balance; instead, one 
could see, for example, a $5.00 charge or a $120.00 payment made by 
that—or any—account.85 
Similar to the online banking example, each blockchain user has a 
unique code associated with their wallet (here, wallets are analogous 
to bank accounts and the unique code is analogous to bank accounts 
numbers).86  Additionally, there is a public record, or ledger, of all 
transactions made.  The public can see when and how much each 
unique wallet sent or received.87  While the public cannot see how 
much a specific account has, the public can see the worth of each 
account’s transaction and how these transactions affected the total 
balance of a blockchain’s associated cryptocurrency.88 
Lastly, for applications other than financial trading, blockchain’s 
tracking of incoming and outgoing variables offers ledger-based 
accounting that applies to various jobs and uses.  For example, global 
supply chains use blockchain technology.89  Once a checkpoint 
 
83. Id. at 4–5 (“[A] payment address [is] a string of seemingly random 
numbers and letters.”) 
84. See id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 8. 
88. It is normal for a small portion of sent crypto to not make it to the intended 
receiver because a fee is taken out for miners who verified the transaction. Miners 
are paid through these nominal fees, and miners are paid with further cryptocurrency 
once they complete a “block” of transactions. The crypto earned from completing a 
block of transactions does not come from any individual, nor does it come from a 
specific transaction. Rather, the fees from completing a block of transactions comes 
from the original code of the blockchain. For purposes of this article, a cursory 
understanding of this process is sufficient. See Explaining Bitcoin Transaction Fees, 




ssfully%20completed%20or%20valid (last updated Apr. 11, 2021, 1:47). 
89. See Lukas Wiesflecker, 6 Industries Where Vechain Can Be Successful, 
MEDIUM (Sept. 30, 2020), https://medium.com/coinmonks/6-industries-where-
15
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receives products, the products are “delivered” (like funds coming into 
a wallet would be classified as available).90  With each delivery along 
the supply chain, product statuses adjust on the blockchain.  The 
advantages of using a blockchain platform, instead of an online app, 
include greater security and more reliability.91 
B.  Concerns Over Blockchain’s Public Nature 
While blockchain’s public nature allows blockchain to achieve 
high transparency, efficiency, and speed, one concern that arises from 
this public-view dynamic is that, although no one can see a user’s 
name when making transactions, other users can see the code 
associated with anyone’s wallet.  If users can see anyone’s wallet 
information so easily, those users could somehow steal another user’s 
identity more easily.91  In practice, someone could gain access to a 
blockchain wallet by hacking their account, similar to an online bank 
account.92  Just as a lost, stolen, or regrettably-disclosed password can 
lead to negative outcomes in online banking, the same is true for 
blockchain passwords.  However, the fact one’s wallet information 
 
vechain-can-be-successful-2a72a1cda5fe; see generally VECHAIN, 
https://www.vechain.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
90. John Ream et al., Upgrading Blockchains, DELOITTE (June 8, 2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/focus/signals-for-strategists/using-
blockchain-for-smart-contracts.html (“Blockchains can make supply chain and trade 
finance documentation more efficient, by streamlining processes previously spread 
across multiple parties and databases on a single shared ledger. All too often, supply 
chains are hampered by paper-based systems reliant on trading parties and banks 
around the world physically transferring documents, a process that can take weeks 
for a single transaction. Letters of credit and bills of lading must be signed and 
referenced by a multitude of parties, increasing exposure to loss and fraud”). 




20of%20different%20ways (“While the public key cryptography algorithms most 
commonly used in blockchain are generally regarded to be secure, their security can 
be undermined or threatened in a number of different ways”). 
92. Id. (“Even if an account’s private key is generated securely, it can still be 
compromised if it isn’t stored securely. Most blockchain “hacks” involve the theft of 
private keys from insecure cryptocurrency exchanges or via phishing and SIM 
hijacking attacks”). 
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(account number) is public is not sufficient—by itself—to hack or 
learn another’s password.93 
Another concern arising from blockchain’s public-view dynamic 
is stealing.  Although a user’s password is as secure as an online 
banking password, new users are often concerned their public wallet 
information could make it easier for hackers or scammers to steal 
from the network.  Remarkably, however, miners prevent stealing.94 
Miners verify every transaction across a blockchain network.95  
To be successful, a scammer would first have to create a program to 
steal the funds from the transacting wallets, and then, the scammer 
would have to create a program to hack a majority of the global 
mining network to access the wallets.96  The manpower and 
infrastructure needed to pull off such an attack is incalculable. 
Further, even if a hacker tried to scam a small portion of 
transactions, rather than the entirety of the aggregate transactions on a 
blockchain network, the hacker would still have to penetrate a 
majority of the global mining network.97  Instead of incredibly high 
costs leading to the aggregate of all funds exchanged via blockchain, 
the hacker would still incur incredible costs only to receive a 
relatively small return.  Thus, blockchain hacking is often too 
expensive for criminals to engage in successfully.98 
 
93. Cf. id. (except for in the very narrow domain of quantum computing. “The 
security of public key cryptography depends on the “hardness” of the problems that 
it is based on.”). 
94. See GREWAL-CARR & MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 2, 6. See generally 
Euny Hong, How Does Bitcoin Mining Work?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 7, 2021), 
https://www.investopedia.com/tech/how-does-bitcoin-mining-work/. 
95.  GREWAL-CARR & MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 7. See infra Part II.C. 
96. Yes, Blockchain Can Be Hacked: 3 Ways It Can Be Done, EPIQ GLOBAL 
[hereinafter Yes, Blockchain Can Be Hacked], https://www.epiqglobal.com/en-
us/thinking/blog/blockchain-can-be-hacked (last visited Feb. 28, 2021). 
97. A hacker would need the capability to hack an entire “block” of 
transactions. See GREWAL-CARR & MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 4 (“Many 
transactions occur in the network at any time. All the pending transactions in a given 
timeframe are grouped (in a block) for verification. Each block has a unique 
identifying number, creation time and reference to the previous block”) (emphasis 
added). But see BLOCKCHAIN, https://www.blockchain.com/charts/n-transactions-
per-block (last visited Mar. 7, 2021) (showing that around 2,000 transactions are 
held within a single block); Yes, Blockchain Can Be Hacked, supra note 97 
(detailing the complexity of 51% attacks). 
98. Yes, Blockchain Can Be Hacked, supra note 97. 
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Lastly, the openness of blockchain transactions presents privacy 
concerns.99  Such concerns are peculiar for two reasons.  First, the 
open nature of the technology allows for blockchain’s security.100  
Allowing the world to see each transaction minimizes fraud and 
stealing while miners verify each new transaction based off previous, 
public transactions.  Without previous public information, the 
verifiability of new transactions would not be possible.   
Second, in the event the government uses blockchain data against 
citizens in criminal cases,101 claims of reasonable expectations of 
privacy in their blockchain data would be confounding.  Blockchain’s 
essence relies on public information.102  Blockchain offers secure 
global transacting which is only possible because its public nature.103  
By virtue of enjoying the advantages of blockchain, anyone who uses 
blockchain is actively affirming public information sharing.  
Blockchain is distinguished from cell phone data, for example, 
because blockchain users are active in their participation.104  Cell 
phone users passively offer information of their most “mundane tasks” 
by simply turning on their phone.105  Ultimately, blockchain’s public 
nature is essential to its effectiveness, and upon further inspection, the 
drawbacks are not as problematic. 
 
99. Paul Belonick, Transparency is the New Privacy, 23 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
114, 119 (2020). 
100.  GREWAL-CARR & MARSHALL, supra note 77 at 5, 9. 
101. See Robert A. Schwinger, A Little Less Privacy: Cryptocurrency 
Transactions Under the Fourth Amendment, N.Y. L.J. (July 27, 2020, 1:13 PM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/07/27/a-little-less-privacy-
cryptocurrency-transactions-under-the-fourth-amendment/. 
102.  GREWAL-CARR & MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 8. 
103. Id. at 7. 
104. See Schwinger, supra note 101 (The Fifth Circuit recently heard a case 
involving a defendant claiming a reasonable expectation of privacy in his Bitcoin 
transaction and affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that he had a privacy interest in the information held in the 
Bitcoin blockchain, holding that “the information on Bitcoin’s blockchain is far 
more analogous to the bank records in Miller and the telephone call logs in Smith 
[two cases where the Fourth Amendment did not extend to offer defendants 
protections] than the [cell phone location information] in Carpenter [a case where 
the Fourth Amendment did protect the defendant’s expectation of privacy].”) 
105. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
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C.  Miners and Cryptocurrency Defined 
Individual users can edit blockchain’s ledger because every time a 
user transacts using blockchain, that transaction must become publicly 
available.106  When one user transfers money using blockchain 
technology, that user is editing the public ledger.107  The “edits” to a 
blockchain constitute transfers of funds, and every transfer made on 
the blockchain is available for public view.108  Any blockchain user 
who wants to transfer money must have a unique wallet address and 
must send their money to another blockchain user’s unique wallet 
address.109  The transfers are similar to transactions within a large 
online bank account.  Anyone in the world can transact.110  The 
blockchain’s ledger tracks every transaction between unique addresses 
like a public spreadsheet, tracking users’ edits. 
A significant hurdle is the potential to deceptively transfer money 
from third parties to a user’s own address.111  In other words, 
blockchain needs to prevent users from stealing other’s money.112  If 
anyone can edit the ledger, then it is possible for a user to edit a ledger 
in a way that transfers money to that user.113  However, miners make 
such a scenario avoidable.114 
Miners are global users who control powerful computers and 
ensure each address receives the correct amount of money.115  The 
problems of double-spending,116 fraud, and theft are virtually 
 
106.  GREWAL-CARR & MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 4–5. 
107. See id. 
108. Id. at 4. 
109. Id. at 4–5. 
110. See id. 
111. Yes, Blockchain Can Be Hacked, supra note 97. 
112. Id. 
113. See id. 
114. Miners are the term used for Proof of Work blockchains. Their role is 
similar to that of stakers or bakers on other blockchains. The biggest smart contract 
platform, Ethereum, is currently transitioning from a Proof of Work system to a 
Proof of Stake system. See Hong, supra note 94; See generally GREWAL-CARR & 
MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 6. 
115. See id. 
116. Jake Frankenfield, Double-Spending, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/doublespending.asp (last updated June 30, 
2020) (“Double-spending is the risk that a digital currency can be spent twice. It is a 
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nonexistent because the network of miners on any given blockchain 
shield against such problems.117  Miners are not individual users who 
manually comb through masses of transactions.118  Miners commonly 
employ networks of computers or utilize powerful computer programs 
to sift through transactions.119 
Creating these massive computer networks to verify blockchain 
edits and transfers comes at a price.120  Miners earn cryptocurrency for 
verifying transactions on a blockchain network.121  Although miners 
earn transaction fees, miners’ fees are nowhere near as high as 
traditional intermediary fees.122  Further, each blockchain has an 
associated cryptocurrency.  Cryptocurrencies are exchanged for 
government-backed currencies.  Cryptocurrencies are also traded on 
exchanges similar to foreign currencies, securities, or commodities.  
Cryptocurrencies are becoming easier to sell for government-backed 
currency due to numerous exchange platforms launching around 
2017.123 
In exchange for verifying transactions on blockchains, miners 
earn that blockchain’s associated cryptocurrency.124  The miners are 
financially incentivized to accurately verify as many transactions as 
possible.125  The large number of miners verifying transactions act as 
 
potential problem unique to digital currencies because digital information can be 
reproduced relatively easily by savvy individuals who understand the blockchain 
network and the computing power necessary to manipulate it.”). 





122. See Explaining Bitcoin, supra note 88. See also Someone Transferred a 
Billion Dollars, supra note 10. 
123. Horn, supra note 69. 
124.  GREWAL-CARR & MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 4–5 (“[Using Bitcoin as 
an example,] [t]he algorithm rewards the winning miner with [Bitcoins], and the 
new block is added to the front of the blockchain.”) 
125. For example, on February 8, 2021, the price of one Bitcoin was about 
$48,000. A Bitcoin miner would earn $300,000 (6.25 x 48,000) for completing a 
block. Hong, supra note 94 (“The rewards for Bitcoin mining are reduced by half 
every four years. When Bitcoin was first mined in 2009, mining one block would 
earn you 50 [Bitcoins]. In 2012, this was halved to 25 [Bitcoins]. By 2016, this was 
halved again to 12.5 [Bitcoins]. On May 11, 2020, the reward halved again to 
6.25.”). 
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a group vote that can cancel deceptive transactions should such 
transactions be attempted. 
D.  Smart Contracts Defined 
With blockchain, mining, and cryptocurrency defined, one can 
begin to understand smart contracts.  If blockchains are public ledgers 
with verifiability, then smart contracts are public escrows with 
verifiability.126  Smart contracts are “pieces of code that run ‘on top of 
the blockchain.’”127  Smart contracts, unlike the basic blockchain 
transactions, are conditional instruments for transferring money.128 
Although smart contracts function differently than standard 
blockchain transactions, the underlying principles and benefits are 
similar.129  Smart contracts offer efficiency, transparency, and 
speed.130  Additionally, the public can view smart contracts executed 
on a blockchain.131  Unlike standard blockchain transactions, which 
execute when a sender initiates a transaction, smart contracts will not 
execute until there is an outside condition met.132 
Smart contracts are most easily described using an example.  
Imagine Bob tells Sally that he will give her $5 if it rains today.  Then, 
Bob deposits his $5 into a smart contract on his phone.  Later that day, 
it rains, and Bob now owes Sally $5.  Relying on a reputable weather 
app, the smart contract gains data that it is raining in Bob’s current 
 
126. Darcy W.E. Allen et al., The Governance of Blockchain Dispute 
Resolution, 25 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75, 78 (2019). 
127. Id. at 76. 
128. Id. at 78. 
129. See Ream, supra note 90 (stating blockchain-based smart contract 
benefits include speed and real-time updates; fewer intermediaries; and lower cost). 
130. Id. 
131. See id. (“Smart contracts are executed by a computer network that uses 
consensus protocols to agree upon the sequence of actions resulting from the 
contract’s code . . . [w]ith a shared database running a blockchain protocol, the smart 
contracts auto-execute, and all parties validate the outcome instantaneously and 
without need for a third-party intermediary”); see also GREWAL-CARR & 
MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 6 (“The individuals involved are anonymous, but the 
[smart] contract is in the public ledger”). 
132. Allen et al., supra note 127, at 78. 
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location.133  Upon the input from the weather app, Bob’s $5, which 
was held similarly to escrow, gets deposited into Sally’s account. 
Miners verify smart contract transfers upon the met condition.134  
Miners play a similar role in smart contract technology to the role they 
play in standard blockchain transactions.135 Moreover, the same 
incentive-driven parameters exist for smart contracts.136  Smart 
contract miners are also rewarded with cryptocurrency when they 
verify transactions on the associated smart contract network. 
In sum, blockchains can transfer money from user to user upon 
agreement or upon a condition being met.  If users opt to transfer 
money only after meeting a condition, they are engaging in a smart 
contract.   
III. THE PATHS REGULATORS MAY CHOOSE FROM WHEN PERMITTING 
INVESTMENT FUNDS’ USE OF SMART CONTRACTS 
While both smart contracts and intermediaries can conditionally 
hold money, intermediaries also hold investor capital or otherwise 
provide investors with security until intermediaries are certain capital 
gets used in an expected manner by portfolio managers.  Although 
efficient at conditional transacting, smart contracts cannot provide an 
intermediary’s human guidance.  Additionally, smart contracts are not 
immune to disputes occurring after executed transactions.137  Perhaps 
future development will help smart contracts meet fund needs more 
fully,138 but smart contracts’ current limitations hold back adoption 
within financial trading. 
 
133. See Cryptopedia Staff, What is Chainlink and How Does It Work?, 
GEMINI, https://gemini.com/learn/what-is-chainlink-and-how-does-it-work (last 
updated Fe. 26, 2021) (The smart contract “gains data” through “oracles” such as 
Chainlink.); see generally CHAINLINK, https://chain.link/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
134. See Hong, supra note 94 (noting the role of miners in verifying bitcoin 
transactions). 
135. See generally id. 
136. See generally id. 
137. Allen et al., supra note 127, at 76, 82. 
138. See Davidson, supra note 6, at 3–4 (stating that “[i]t is unclear at this 
early stage whether any of the current hype surrounding blockchain is justified.” 
Nevertheless, future blockchain innovations and judicial rulings could lead to more 
competent blockchain features.). 
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Smart contracts have short-term potential to supplement select 
intermediaries within the scope of command services as a means of 
increasing efficiency, transparency, and lowering costs.139  Investors 
will not be sufficiently protected if smart contracts fully replace 
custodian banks and other financial intermediaries140 because 
intermediaries provide guidance and advice in addition to facilitating 
fund transactions.  For example, custodial banks do more than hold 
money and perform duties based off a single met condition.  The job 
of a custodian bank involves many complex tasks, some of which 
require emotional intelligence.  Financial intermediaries act as agents 
on behalf of investors.  Rather than requiring investors to have robust 
knowledge of investment portfolios themselves, investors are 
confident that each intermediary will provide competent service on 
their behalf.  Having a competent agent in place to oversee 
investments preserves the principle of investor protection. 
Regulators should consider smart contract technology’s effects on 
the financial intermediary sector because doing nothing “leaves a legal 
gap and increases uncertainty for market actors.”141  While efficiency-
minded regulators may want regulation to move quickly there are a 
number of problems regulators should contemplate.  To the extent 
financial intermediaries are replaced with smart contracts in the future, 
regulators should consider what principles will positively affect 
investors. 
This section addresses three possible paths regulators could 
explore.  First, regulators could elect to wait-and-see what the future 
holds for smart contracts.  Under this approach, regulators remain 
inactive while allowing the market to decide which regulations are 
relevant.  Under this wait-and-see approach, regulators may even 
adopt a laissez-faire attitude and choose not to regulate smart contracts 
within financial trading.  Second, regulators could heavily regulate the 
industry, anticipating every derivative or consumer protection issue.  
Under this approach, regulators would not only address smart 
 
139. See generally Someone Transferred a Billion Dollars, supra note 11. 
140. See, e.g.,  THE CLEARING HOUSE, THE CUSTODY SERVICES OF BANKS iv 
(2016),  
https://www.davispolk.com/files/20160728_tch_white_paper_the_custody_services
_of_banks.pdf (stating that custodians have the ability to help clients with liquidity 
problems). 
141. Agnikhotram & Kouroutakis, supra note 69, at 304. 
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contracts, but would also proactively place restrictions on smart 
contracts before the technology gains extensive adoption.142  Third, 
regulators could adopt a moderate approach by maintaining derivative 
regulations and consumer protections while simultaneously 
introducing smart contract exceptions for limited intermediary 
functions.  This approach allows for increased efficiency through 
smart contracts’ low cost, high-speed, and high transparency.  Limited 
smart contract utilization would also allow the incumbent 
intermediary industry to continue providing protections to investors 
while maintaining the current market share.  Ultimately, investors 
would benefit from a moderate approach because lower fees produce 
increased investor returns. 
A. The Wait-and-See Approach 
Under the wait-and-see approach regulators would employ a 
hands-off approach to smart contracts until the financial, 
technological, and regulatory environments are more certain.143  
Regulators may also want to let the dust settle before regulating a 
cutting edge technology due to the aftereffects of a global 
pandemic.144  Adoption rates of smart contracts within the financial 
industry and use cases for smart contracts may change following the 
unique challenges of the post-pandemic world. 
Regulators may want to hold off on regulating smart contracts 
until the technology offers more features which make adoption 
inevitable.145  Currently, regulators are not facing political urgency to 
address smart contracts because the general public’s smart-contract 
 
142. Shiv, What is Technology Adoption Life Cycle and Chasm?, MEDIUM 
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://medium.com/@shivayogiks/what-is-technology-adoption-life-
cycle-and-chasm-e07084e7991f (stating “[t]he most difficult step [for a given 
technology to gain adoption] is making the transition between early adopters and [a] 
majority [of users]. This is the chasm . . . [i]f a successful firm can create a major 
effect in which enough momentum builds, then the product becomes a standard”). 
143. See generally ZHOUDAN XIE, RISING POLICY UNCERTAINTY UNDER 




144. See generally id. 
145. Horn, supra note 69. 
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use is minimal.  In comparison, Congress enacted Dodd-Frank after 
the failures of the Great Recession received immense media attention.  
It is less likely that smart contracts will be in a similar place within the 
public consciousness as the Great Recession was. 
Nevertheless, remaining silent on smart contract regulation may 
indirectly lead to further unregulated use by non-professionals.146  
Provisions in Dodd-Frank set out to regulate new-for-its-time 
investment vehicles unaddressed by past regulatory frameworks.147  
Due to the silence of the pre-Dodd framework, unregulated 
investments spread pervasively throughout the global financial 
market.  Although the result was disastrous, we should not overlook 
the lessons learned from the speed with which those new technologies 
gained adoption.   
If financial regulators wait, those same regulators may act too late, 
after widespread adoption of this new technology occurs.148  Without 
regulation in the short-term, misuse of smart contracts may arise in 
ways regulators could not anticipate.149  The financial market would 
benefit if regulators acted and did not wait-and-see.150  If timely 
regulations are soon adopted, then funds would enjoy increased 
efficiency and regulators could ensure consumer protection for 
investors from the outset of smart contract adoption.  Regulators could 
begin with crafting laws aimed at consumer financial products which 
already utilize smart contracts.151 
 
146. Id. 
147. David S. Huntington et al., Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial 
Regulation Legislation, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 7, 2020), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/07/summary-of-dodd-frank-financial-
regulation-legislation/ (“The Act introduces significant direct regulation of [over-
the-counter derivatives] transactions”). 
148. See Horn, supra note 69 (noting DeFi’s rising popularity); but see 
Agnikhotram & Kouroutakis, supra note 69, at 305, 327 (concluding that smart 
contracts should be construed as very narrowly fitting within the current legal 
landscape). 
149. Horn, supra note 69. 
150.  Agnikhotram & Kouroutakis, supra note 69, at 305 (“While possibly 
good for innovation, ‘waiting and seeing’, leaves a legal gap and increases 
uncertainty for market actors”). 
151. See generally Horn, supra note 69. 
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The crypto industry’s DeFi niche currently uses smart 
contracts.152  The fact private individuals across the world are acting 
as solo central banks and hedge funds should not be dismissed.  
Dwarfed are the many risks addressed in the discussion of the non-
transparent financial intermediaries by risks incurred by individuals 
trading in the DeFi space.153  Some DeFi platforms constitute the most 
exotic investments American citizens can meander into.154  By 
waiting, regulators allow DeFi space users to operate within a wild 
west playground, complete with some of the most volatile assets in 
existence.155  Staying silent on the use of smart contracts could also 
have unintended consequences for retail investors who entrust their 
money with unregistered portfolio managers.  Allowing hedge funds 
to use smart contracts as a supplement to current intermediaries would 
be more efficient, and it would preserve consumer protection.  
Ultimately, the opportunities for everyday investors within the crypto 
sector of finance are numerous.  There is excitement about the 
potential yield on various DeFi investments.  Nevertheless, substantial 
risk awaits early adopters.  Blockchain technology is a positive 
innovation for American society.  However, the lack of regulation on 
smart contract technologies within finance would allow blockchain’s 
drawbacks to go unrestrained.  If regulators do not act, the large-scale 
rewards for engaging in this new and exciting field may never exceed 
the risks. 
B. Preventative-Regulation Approach 
Regulators could also preemptively seek solutions which dampen 




154. Daniel Cawrey, Meet the People Who Do Yield Farming, COINDESK 
(Oct. 11, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/meet-people-who-do-yield-farming-defi-
cryptocurrency. 
155. One example of an extremely volatile asset that DeFi investors are 
exposed to is Ampleforth. Ampleforth is a cryptocurrency which—by design—
gained and lost 70% of its value on multiple instances within a week’s time due to 
the wait-and-see approach. COINMARKETCAP, 
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ampleforth/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
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momentum.156  This approach would allow independent agencies, like 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) or the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), to have jurisdiction over smart 
contracts.157  Due to the CFPB’s consumer and banking jurisdiction, 
smart contract regulations could be enforced on consumers using 
smarts contracts within the DeFi niche.158  Additionally, the CFTC 
could have jurisdiction over smart contracts because the CFTC 
enforces regulations on swaps, futures, and certain option trades.159  If 
the CFPB or CFTC heavily regulated smart contracts, so that smart 
contracts could never be feasibly adopted as a supplement to 
intermediaries, then the problems of inefficiency, expense, and non-
transparency would remain. 
First, under the preventative-regulatory approach, smart contracts 
would likely never gain adoption to supplement financial 
intermediaries and increase efficiency for investors.160  Smart 
contracts execute quickly, and fees to use smart contracts are 
nominal.161  Under this approach, the most probable solution to the 
inefficiency problem is for intermediaries to internally increase 
efficiency and affordability.  If the recent history of the financial 
sector is any indication, then the probability of financial intermediates 
innovating to help reduce fees for investors is low.162 
Financial intermediaries benefit from the current regulatory setup 
because their fees are mandatory.  While incentives for intermediaries 
to run as profitably as possible are present, there is also incentive to 
bill as much as possible in fees (to increase revenue).  Intermediaries 
wanting to increase fees and investors wanting to decrease fees creates 
a conflict.  The current regulatory framework gives intermediaries an 
advantage because firms within the intermediary sector must reduce 
fees to compete with other intermediary firms).  Introducing smart 
 
156.  Agnikhotram & Kouroutakis, supra note 69, at 304 (noting a common 
skeptical viewpoint against smart contracts: “the European Banking Institute, the 
European Parliamentary Service and United Kingdom’s Chief Scientist  expound 
unassailable risks”). 
157. Chen, CTFC, supra note 13.  Probasco, CFPB, supra note 14. 
158. Chen, CTFC, supra note 14. 
159. Probasco, CFPB, supra note 14. 
160. Shiv, supra note 143. 
161. Ream, supra note 90. 
162. Judge, supra note 4, at 577. 
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contracts would help shift the advantages towards investors.  If no 
disruptive technology has a feasible chance of entering the 
intermediary market, then the intermediary incumbents would benefit. 
Finally, concerns over the lack of transparency are also not likely 
to improve for investors.163  While investors would be protected, like 
they are today, from poor decision making on behalf of portfolio 
managers, investors would also have to endure the risk that custodial 
banks are lending out their capital.  Smart contracts, due to the public 
view of blockchain technology, can solve this problem.  Under the 
preventative-regulatory approach, smart contracts would not have the 
opportunity to present itself as a viable solution to the transparency 
problem.  Barring further regulation of custodial intermediaries, 
investors would suffer from adverse effects stemming from lower 
transparency. 
C. Moderate Approach 
A final approach to regulating smart contracts preserves the 
consumer protection effects of Dodd-Frank and increases the 
efficiency for investors.  Efficiency-minded regulators like the results 
of consumer protection regulations but do not like the associated 
costs.164  Regulators could craft a moderate approach which 
simultaneously maintains Dodd-Frank consumer protections and 
allows pooled investment funds to use smart contracts in a limited 
capacity. 
A moderate approach avoids the problematic wait-and-see 
outcomes165 and the preventative-regulation concerns regarding 
efficiency.  Moreover, it does not result in high intermediary fees.  
Regulators can balance efficiency and consumer protection by using 
smart contracts as supplements to the advisory expertise financial 
intermediaries already provide. 
Further, this approach keeps current regulations in place and 
authorizes smart contracts for a handful of uses, such as safekeeping 
 
163. See Judge, supra note 4, at 611; see also Kaaru, supra note 43. 
164. See Zywicki, supra note 20, at 927 (asserting that greater efficiency—
rather that increased cost and bureaucracy—helped mitigate a “thriving class of loan 
sharks”). 
165. See Horn, supra note 69; see also Agnikhotram & Kouroutakis, supra 
note 69, at 304. 
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investor capital in a smart contract rather than a custodial bank.  Smart 
contracts could also reduce investor’s fees.166  Under this approach, 
current intermediaries would not be replaced fully. 
Additionally, regulators could choose to expand consumer 
protections to address unregulated smart contract use within the DeFi 
niche.167  Remember, the public is currently operating as unlicensed, 
solo central banks or hedge funds with no disclosure requirements.168  
To address this, regulators should require the public to register or 
obtain minimal training before advertising themselves as financial 
agents.  In addition to authorizing limited smart contract use within 
pooled investment fund operations, regulators should also broadly 
sculpt a comprehensive framework for smart contract use in multiple 
domains.  Legislators can shape new regulations to fit the existing 
framework by considering the consumer protections already in place. 
One concern with a moderate approach is that intermediaries will 
lose market share or be constrained by the introduction of smart 
contracts.169  Intermediaries’ fees earned from services currently 
offered could be reduced if funds execute a portion of those services 
with smart contracts.  The intermediary firms would see lower 
revenue, but those same firms could also employ less staff to offset or 
mitigate the reduction in revenue.  While intermediary firms could 
experience less profitability in the future, their market share relative to 
direct competitors would be unaffected because the moderate 
approach would impact each intermediary and its direct competitors 
equally.  In other words, while intermediary firms prefer the current 
regulations over the moderate approach,170 intermediaries would 
overcome the moderate approach’s negative effects. 
 
166. Ream, supra note 90. 
167. Horn, supra note 69. 
168. See Horn, supra note 69 (noting how Defi has provided the public with 
the following results: “Voting that is nothing more than a poll that project 
developers may choose to execute — or not; and [b]ig sacks of tokens pre-mined by 
founders at the expense of the community”); see also Eng-Tuck Cheah, supra note 
71 (“Regulators are having to weigh the delicate balance between stifling innovation 
and failing to protect society from such risks as individuals putting their money into 
an unregulated space”). 
169. See generally Judge, supra note 4, at 592–593. 
170. Id. at 578 (“intermediaries may use these same informational and 
positional advantages to promote and entrench high-fee institutional arrangements”). 
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Another concern with the moderate approach is the job loss the 
financial intermediary industry would experience due to automation.  
The effects of automation on intermediary jobs could mirror the 
effects automation had on manufacturing jobs.  With the moderate 
approach, workers losing their jobs to smart contracts are likely better 
positioned to recover from automation than the average manufacturing 
worker under a similar automation phenomenon.171  Assuming white-
collar workers can recover, introducing smart contracts into the 
intermediary sector will lead to increased returns for investors via 
lower fees incurred by pooled investment funds.  This outcome, 
although theoretical, could lead to increased equity for a greater 
number of people. 
Regulators should preserve the rules of the road established by 
Dodd-Frank.  Increased consumer protections safeguard investors 
from the surrounding risks to their capital investments.  This increase 
in consumer-protected contracting should remain in American 
commerce.  However, there is also an opportunity to help investors on 
another front.  If regulators use a moderate approach to smart contract 
regulation, they will strike a balance between efficiency and consumer 
protection within the domain of pooled investment fund regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a problem with the current pooled investment fund 
industry.  Although intermediaries are slower, less efficient, and less 
transparent than smart contract technology, smart contracts are not yet 
able to supplement financial intermediaries.  The result is higher fees 
when using pooled investment funds.  While implementing smart 
contracts into the financial sector may seem like a good idea to 
entrepreneurs,172 America must first address smart contacts’ many 
 
171. See generally Michael Lucci, Divergence: White-Collar Jobs Up, 
Manufacturing Jobs Disappearing in Illinois, ILL. POL’Y (June 22, 2015), 
https://www.illinoispolicy.org/divergence-white-collar-jobs-up-manufacturing-jobs-
disappearing-in-illinois/; see also Bahrat Ramamurti, The Shift Toward Remote 
Work Could Leave Blue-Collar Workers Behind, CNN (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/16/perspectives/remote-work-blue-collar/index.html 
(discussing the effects of COVID-19 on the workforce). 
172. Melon as a Solution, MELON, https://melonprotocol.com/docs/solution/ 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2021); What is Enzyme Finance, MESSARI, 
https://messari.io/asset/enzyme-finance/profile (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
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challenges.  Such challenges include the current shortcomings of the 
technology; striking a proper balance between efficiency and 
consumer protection; and the implications that follow from staying 
silent. 
The legal industry’s status quo is tough to penetrate.173  A broader 
discussion, coupled with fulfilled potential in smart contract 
technology, could change a lot of dynamics in securities law.  
Automation has benefits across many industries, but regulators should 
be wary of changing too much too fast.  Dodd-Frank’s increase in 
consumer protection will aid in preventing further problems that led to 
the Great Recession.  Regulators should not toss aside the hard-fought 






173. See generally Holderman, supra note 68 (noting the legal profession’s 
difficulties in adapting to new technologies and paradigm shifts). 
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